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IN CAMERA REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A 
THREATENED OPPORTUNITY? 
William R. Mendelsohn* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The public has become increasingly aware of the Cold War's tre-
mendous environmental costs to the United States. One of the best 
known examples of Cold War contamination, the Department of En-
ergy's facility at Rocky Flats, Colorado, reveals not only that the 
United States government failed to consider the environmental con-
sequences of its actions, but also that the government went so far as 
to conceal those consequences from the public for decades.! Although 
one may argue that the end of the Cold War should herald the end of 
such intense secrecy, the perceived threat of such nations as Iraq and 
Libya has been used to justify the continuation of Cold War secrecy.2 
The ongoing controversy surrounding the Groom Lake Air Force 
Base in Nevada shows that the conflict between national security and 
environmental protection still exists. The facts of this case serve as a 
brief introduction to how the military still can use national security 
concerns to delay or avoid compliance with environmental statutes.3 
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 1995-1996. 
1 See Laurent R. Hourcle, Military Secrecy and Environmental Compliance, 2 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 316, 316-17 (1993). 
2 See id. at 318-19. 
3 The Groom Lake controversy involves alleged violations of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The primary focus 
of this Comment, however, will be on the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321-70a (1988 & Supp. v 1993), but the conflict between national security and environmental 
interests remains essentially the same regardless of the actual statute involved. 
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The plaintiffs in the Groom Lake suit, Frost v. Perry,4 are six former 
Groom Lake workers and the widow of another former worker.5 These 
plaintiffs claim that the Air Force illegally burned hazardous materi-
als at Groom Lake.6 The plaintiffs are seeking damages for exposure 
to these materials, and an injunction against future burnings.7 The Air 
Force attempted to block the suit by claiming that national security 
regulations prohibit the Air Force from admitting or denying the 
existence of the base.8 Had the Air Force succeeded with this claim, 
the inability to establish the existence of the base would have led to 
a ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction over the site.9 The Air Force 
has since modified this jurisdictional claim by refusing to release the 
name of the facility because, without its official name, the suit cannot 
go forward. lO The Air Force's arguments almost certainly will rely on 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v. Catholic 
Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, which upheld the federal 
government's claim that national security interests allow the govern-
ment to avoid disclosing information about activities that might dam-
age the environment.ll 
In light of such present-day examples as Groom Lake Air Force 
Base, this Comment seeks to address the government's use of national 
security claims to conceal environmental abuse, and argues for the 
use of in camera review to balance competing interests. Section II of 
this Comment describes the statutory basis for the military's claim 
4 Frost v. Perry, No. CVS-94-00714 (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 1994). The plaintiffs have also filed suit 
against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for not enforcing relevant environmental 
regulations. Doe v. Browner, No. 94-CV-01684 (D.D.C. Aug. 2,1994) (cited in Hazardous Waste: 
Agency Failed to Enforce Waste Laws at 'Secret' Air Base, Lawsuit Alleges, 25 Env't Rep. 711 
(BNA) (Aug. 12, 1994». 
5 Hazardous Waste: Widow, Former Workers Sue Air Force Over RCRA Violations at 
'Secret' Base, 25 Env't Rep. 733 (BNA) (Aug. 19, 1994). 
6Id. 
7Id. 
8 See Keith Rogers, Area 51: Feds Drop "National Security" Defense in Suit, LAS VEGAS 
REV.-J., Nov. 11, 1994, reprinted in GREENWIRE, Nov. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Curnws File. 
9 See Benjamin Wittes, Secrecy Case Strategy Emerges, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at 14. Of 
course, it is impossible for a military installation to be truly secret. The people living in the area 
obviously are aware of military activity at the site. Furthermore, the plaintiffs' counsel was 
prepared to have staff from the Russian embassy in Washington, D.C. testify that the Russian 
government also was aware of the site. Id. Arguably, the fact that the former Soviet Union, 
from which the base was supposed to be kept secret, already knows about the base renders 
current efforts to maintain its secrecy moot. See id. 
10 Bruce Shenitz & Sharon Begley, It Dares Not Speak Its Name, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 20, 1995, 
at 55. 
11 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of HawaiilPeace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
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that national security concerns frequently exempt the military from 
the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).12 
Section III examines how the courts have treated this exemption, and 
how judicial decisions may result in a pre-NEPA situation in which 
the military could act without regard for environmental consequences.13 
Section IV discusses one method-in camera review-that may allow 
the judiciary to ensure that the military is complying with NEPA in 
those circumstances in which the public cannot.14 Unfortunately, one 
appellate court, the Second Circuit, has declined to use in camera 
review to ensure military compliance with NEPA, and by so doing the 
Second Circuit has jeopardized one of the few ways through which 
the public can challenge the military's compliance with NEPA.15 Sec-
tion V concludes with a discussion of why courts should be hesitant 
in excusing the military from NEPA compliance.16 
II. THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
The environmental effects of proposed agency actions involving 
national security concerns can create conflicts between NEPA!7 and 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).18 In general, NEPA man-
dates disclosure of an agency action's possible impact upon the envi-
ronment,19 while FOIA designates certain types of information that 
need not be disclosed.20 This section describes how legislators at-
tempted to balance the potential conflict between these statutes. 
A. The National Environmental Policy Act 
Congress enacted NEPA in 1970 in order to encourage a national 
goal of "us[ing] all practicable means and measures ... to create and 
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in produc-
tive harmony."2! To further this goal, NEPA creates specific duties for 
all federal agencies.22 NEPA seeks to regulate the federal govern-
1242 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70a. See infra section II. 
13 See infra section III. 
14 See infra section IV. 
15 See infra 146-58 and accomanying text. 
16 See infra section V. 
1742 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70a. 
18 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). 
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
20 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)-(9). 
2142 U.S.C. § 4331(a). 
22 [d. § 4332. 
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ment's environmental activity by requiring that any "major Federal 
action" be accompanied by an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).23 
Congress intended the EIS requirement to force the agency involved 
to take account of the possible environmental consequences of its 
planned actions, and to include those consequences in the agency's 
decision whether to proceed with its planned actions.24 By implication, 
NEPA serves as an assurance to the general public that federal 
agencies will take the environment into consideration when contem-
plating proposed actions.25 
NEPA also requires federal agencies to make each EIS available to 
other agencies in the federal, state, and local governments, as well as 
to the general public.26 Congress intended this provision to enable 
other governmental bodies and the public to observe and comment on 
an EIS.27 Perhaps more importantly, the publication requirement serves 
to notify the public that the federal government is aware of and 
responding to the public's environmental concerns.23 
B. The Freedom of Information Act 
Congress passed FOIA in 1967 in order to provide the public with 
a legal right of access to federal government records.29 FOIA sets out 
the procedures by which members of the public may exercise their 
right to acquire information about the federal government.30 The text 
of FOIA is grounded upon the assumption that citizens have a right 
to government information.31 Within FOIA, however, are a series of 
exceptions describing those types of information that an agency need 
not release to the public.32 For the purposes of this Comment, the 
most important of these exemptions is the exemption for classified 
materials.33 
23 ld. § 4332(2)(C). 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973). 
30 See 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
31 See id. 
321d. §§ 552(b)(1)-(9). 
33 ld. § 552(b)(1). The decision to classify information is based on Executive Orders that the 
information should be kept secret in order to protect national defense or foreign policy interests. 
ld. 
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Congress explicitly made NEPA subordinate to FOIA.34 NEPA 
requires that an EIS "be made available to the President, the Council 
on Environmental Quality, and to the public," subject to the provi-
sions and exemptions of FOIA.35 If an agency's EIS contains classified 
information, FOIA allows the agency to invoke national security in-
terests in order to refuse to release the EIS to the public.36 
The result of NEPA's deference to FOIA is that any federal agency 
involved in matters of national security may attempt to use that 
involvement to avoid complying with NEPA.37 The extent to which 
such agencies have succeeded is the focus of the following section. 
III. JUDICIAL ApPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS 
Although Congress clearly meant to subject NEPA's disclosure 
goals to the constraints of FOIA, it fell to the courts to determine the 
specific methods by which these statutes were to be integrated and 
applied. Courts have thus had to struggle with how to apply NEPA 
and FOIA when an EIS involves some classified information. Spe-
cifically, how does the presence of classified information affect the rest 
of the information in an EIS? Finding the answer to this question 
requires an understanding of how courts have addressed general 
issues of national security and executive authority. 
A. The Political Question Doctrine 
The military's claim that national security concerns can exempt it 
from complying with environmental statutes originates with the "po-
litical question" doctrine. The United States Supreme Court described 
this doctrine in Baker v. Carr, a case involving alleged civil rights 
violations resulting from Tennessee's method of apportioning its Gen-
eral Assembly seats among the state's counties.38 The doctrine de-
scribes the principle that the judiciary should not interfere with de-
cisions that are political, rather than legislative, in nature.39 The Court 
34 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). An agency should make an EIS available to the public "as provided 
by [FOIA]." Id. 
35Id. 
36 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
37 But see McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608, 612 (10th Cir. 1971). See infra notes 67-69 and 
accompanying text. 
38 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-88, 217 (1962). 
39 See id. at 217; Douglas E. Baker, Note, Anticipating Lamm v. Weinberger II (Romer v. 
Carlucci); The Political Question Doctrine, MX Missiles, and NEPA's Environmental Impact 
Statement, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1250-51 (1988). 
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held that the judiciary should refrain from involving itself in a case 
or controversy that displays "a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."40 
The Court did, however, restrict its position by noting that, while 
the judiciary must be mindful of the political question doctrine, it must 
not abdicate its duty of statutory interpretation.41 The Court held that 
this duty could extend even into the area of foreign policy, which 
traditionally is considered to be an exclusive power of the executive 
branch.42 The Court held that the fact that a given issue "touches" 
upon foreign affairs does not mean that the issue is ipso facto non-jus-
ticiable.43 In a later decision, Japan Whaling Association v. American 
Cetacean Society, the Court expanded upon this idea by noting that 
''we cannot shirk this responsibility [of statutory interpretation] merely 
because our decision may have significant political overtones."44 The 
political importance of a given case or controversy is thus of secon-
dary importance to the judiciary's duty to interpret the statute or 
statutes involved in the dispute.45 
In addition to an obvious analysis of the actual claims involved, 
courts have screened cases for political questions by analyzing the 
type of relief sought by plaintiffs. An example of this "relief-based" 
analysis is Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan.46 
The plaintiffs in Greenham Women sought to block the deployment 
of cruise missiles at a United States air base in England.47 Among the 
plaintiffs' claims were that the deployment would increase substan-
tially the risk of nuclear war or nuclear accidents, that the deploy-
ment was a tortious injury, and that the deployment violated Con-
gress's right to declare war.48 The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, although possessing the authority 
to decide the case,49 was unable to grant the remedy the plaintiffs 
40 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
41 See Baker, supra note 39, at 1251-52 (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean 
Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969». 
42 Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. The Baker Court noted that, while foreign policy would appear to 
be controlled by the executive branch, courts still have an obligation to determine whether a 
given case or controversy could be adjudicated without unduly interfering with political deci-
sions. [d. at 211-12. 
43 [d. at 211. 
44 Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 230. 
45 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
46 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985). 
47 [d. at 1332. 
48 [d. at 1332--33. 
49 [d. at 1336. 
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sought. 50 The court determined that the plaintiffs had sought relief 
that would have had a clear impact upon United States foreign pol-
icy.51 Thus, although the case did not involve a political question as 
defined by Baker v. Carr, the relief the plaintiffs sought would have 
forced the court to impose itself upon a political question-an imper-
missible result in the court's view.52 
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit in McKay v. United States, established limits to the protection 
given to a political question.53 The plaintiffs in McKay alleged that the 
nearby Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant had damaged their prop-
erty.54 The United States District Court for the District of Colorado 
granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the 
decision to produce such weapons was a political question.55 The Tenth 
Circuit upheld that portion of the lower court's decision, but ruled that 
the issue of damages resulting from a political decision was justici-
able. 56 The court determined that although the plaintiffs could not 
question the government's decision to produce the weapons or to site 
their production at the location in question, the political question 
doctrine would not insulate the government from any resulting dam-
ages.57 The McKay decision thus limited application of the political 
question doctrine to claims that directly challenged the government's 
political decisions. 58 The court reasoned that such claims were prem-
ised upon a challenge to a given governmental decision that qualified 
as a political question, and therefore did not involve actual damages.59 
The doctrine did not, however, provide protection to the government 
for claims based upon the non-political repercussions of the govern-
ment's decision.60 
If a federal agency made a decision protected by the political ques-
tion doctrine, would the potential environmental repercussions of that 
decision be actionable? The McKay decision implies that the environ-
mental damages might be actionable, because that decision allows 
50 [d. at 1339. 
51 Greenham Women, 591 F. Supp. at 1339. 
52 [d. at 1336 n.8. 
63 McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464, 470-71 (10th Cir. 1983). 
54 [d. at 465. 
55 See id. at 470. 
56 [d. 
57 [d. 
58 See McKay, 703 F.2d at 470. 
59 See id. at 470-71. 
60 [d. at 470. 
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actions to recover damages for agency activities that are otherwise 
shielded by the political question doctrine.61 
B. NEPA and National Security 
One of the first cases to address the potential conflict between 
NEPA and national security interests was McQueary v. Laird.62 The 
plaintiffs in McQueary were a group of local residents who challenged 
the military's decision to store chemical and biological weapons near 
the Denver airport.63 The plaintiffs claimed that the storage site was 
too close to the airport, thereby risking a catastrophic release of the 
weapons' contents should an aircraft crash into the site.64 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the United 
States District Court for the District of Colorado's dismissal of the 
complaint, noting that the decision of where to locate the storage site 
was within the government's discretion.65 The court reasoned that 
"[p]ublic disclosure relating to military-defense facilities creates seri-
ous problems involving national security," and that the government 
"has traditionally exercised unfettered control with respect to inter-
nal management and operation of federal military establishments."66 
The court, however, declined to extend a total NEPA exemption to 
all military activities that involve national security.67 The court de-
clared that individuals and agencies acting on behalf of the federal 
government did not enjoy an automatic exemption from NEPA.68 The 
military thus had to continue to comply with NEPA's EIS require-
ments, but only if providing an EIS to the public would not adversely 
affect national security.69 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the national security 
exemption to NEPA in the 1981 decision Weinberger v. Catholic Ac-
tion of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, which remains the leading 
case on this issue.7o Like McQueary, the controversy in Catholic Action 
involved the general hazard of storing weapons near a civilian air-
61 See id. 
62 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971). 
63 [d. at 609. 
64 [d. at 609-10. 
65 [d. at 612. 
66 [d. 
67 McQueary, 449 F.2d at 612. 
68 [d. 
69 See id. 
70 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of HawaiilPeace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
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port.71 The Navy had decided to consolidate several weapons and 
ammunition storage sites into a single location on Oahu, Hawaii.72 In 
preparation for this action the Navy produced an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA), a preliminary document used to determine 
whether a more formal EIS is necessary under NEPA.73 In its EIA, 
the Navy concluded that the planned construction of the new storage 
facility and other attendant structures would not create a level of 
environmental impact that necessitated an EIS.74 Therefore, the Navy 
did not prepare an EIS.75 
The Navy's EIA did not, however, discuss the fact that the new 
storage facility was designed to be capable of storing nuclear weap-
ons.76 Because of the separate environmental hazards of nuclear weap-
ons storage, the Navy had prepared a Candidate EIS (CEIS) of the 
potential environmental impacts of this activity.77 A CEIS is the sec-
ond stage of the Navy's evaluation of an action's potential environ-
mental impact.78 The CEIS study, however, was a general-purpose 
assessment of the environmental risks associated with storing, han-
dling, and moving nuclear weapons.79 The CEIS was not written as a 
specific study of the potential impact of these activities at any par-
ticular site.80 The CEIS concluded that "the nuclear aspects of weap-
ons storage do not constitute an 'environmental factor' per se, and can 
be excluded from any assessment prepared under ... NEPA."81 Citing 
the CEIS, the Navy claimed that nuclear weapons storage presented 
71 Id. at 142. 
72Id. at 141. 
73 Id.; see also Council On Environmental Quality Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 
(1994). 
74 Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 141. 
75Id. 
76 See id. at 141-42. 
77Id. at 141. 
78 See Amy J. Sauber, Note, The Application of NEPA to Nuclear Weapons Production, 
Storage, and Testing: Weinberger v. Catholic Action of HawaiilPeace Education Project, 11 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 805, 825 n.154 (1984). This CEIS was especially unusual in that, according 
to the Navy's regulations, it was unnecessary. Id. Ordinarily, the Navy would not prepare a 
CEIS unless the preceding EIA indicated that the prospective action might have a significant 
environmental impact. Id. The preceding EIA for this weapons storage site, however, had 
determined that the site would not have a significant environmental impact. Id. One commen-
tator has suggested that the Navy prepared the CEIS in order to head off the plaintiffs' 
complaints. See id. (citing Annette N. DeBois, The United States Supreme Court Deals a Severe 
Blow to NEPA, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 699, 701 n.19 (1982)). 
79 Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 141-42. 
8°Id. at 142. 
81 Sauber, supra note 78, at 825 n.155. 
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no more of an environmental threat than did the storage of conven-
tional weapons, and thus did not need to be addressed specifically in 
any NEPA-based study.82 
The CEIS's omission of any facts specifically related to the site in 
question was the result of Navy regulations forbidding the Navy from 
either confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons at a 
given location.83 These regulations were based on the Department of 
Defense's Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide, which declared that 
information about whether a "Nuclear-Capable [storage] Unit" actu-
ally has nuclear weapons is classified.84 The rationale behind this clas-
sification decision was that specific information about the location of 
nuclear weapons is a national security interest.85 Thus the official 
Navy response to requests for such information was that "it is the 
policy of the United States government neither to confirm nor deny 
the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or components on board 
any ship, station, or aircraft."86 
The validity of this policy was the focus of Catholic Action because 
the plaintiffs had based their allegations on a claim that the Navy's 
E IA had failed to take account of the risk of a nuclear accident should 
an airplane crash into the site.87 The plaintiffs were caught in a regu-
latory paradox which allowed the Navy to admit that the site could 
store nuclear weapons while simultaneously refusing to state whether 
it actually planned to store such weapons at the site.88 
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii held in 
favor of the Navy, agreeing that the Navy could not comply with 
NEPA's EIS requirement when to do so would compromise national 
security.89 The court did, however, agree with the plaintiffs that the 
storage site was "a major federal action" and thus fell under the 
reporting guidelines of NEPA.90 Because the court could not require 
full NEPA compliance from the Navy, it declined to issue an injunction 
blocking construction on the site until the Navy prepared an EIS.91 
82Id. 
8.1 Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 141. 
84 Sauber, supra note 78, at 818 (citing Brief for Appellant at Appendix H, Weinberger v. 
Catholic Action of HawaiilPeace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981». 
85 See id. at 819. 
86Id. 
87 Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 142. 
88 See Sauber, supra note 78, at 826. 
89 Catholic Action of HawaiilPeace Educ. Project v. Brown, 468 F. Supp.I90, 193 (D. Hawaii 1979). 
9fJ Id. 
91Id. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the district court's ruling, holding that the Navy's security regulations 
did not forbid preparation of an E IS. 92 The court reasoned that an E IS 
was, essentially, a hypothetical document.93 Because an EIS is con-
cerned with what may happen as a result of a given government 
action, the court concluded that there was no reason why the Navy 
could not prepare an EIS documenting what might happen if nuclear 
weapons were stored at the facility.94 
The court noted that an EIS need not rely on classified informa-
tion.95 By stipulating that the site was capable of storing nuclear 
weapons, the Navy had opened the door to inquiries about the possi-
ble environmental consequences of this capability.96 The court rea-
soned that the Navy could prepare a study of these consequences 
without actually revealing any classified information.97 
Additionally, the court held that a study would be an important part 
of assuring the public that the Navy was aware of the concerns 
surrounding nuclear weapons storage.98 The court noted that NEPA 
had an additional purpose-public notification that the federal gov-
ernment is aware of the environmental implications of its actions.99 
Here, at least implicitly, the court recognized that the existence of an 
EIS could be as important as the actual results of the EISYJO 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' 
opinion, criticizing that court's decision that the Navy could prepare 
a "hypothetical" EIS that would comply with NEPA as well as the 
national security restrictions of FOIA.lOl Writing for the majority, 
Justice Rehnquist declared that the "hypothetical" EIS was "a crea-
ture of judicial cloth, not legislative cloth."102 As such, the concept of 
a modified EIS existed with absolutely no support in the relevant 
statutes or regulations, and thus the Court could not consider it to be 
a valid solution to the conflict between NEPA and the national secu-
rity exemption of FOIA.l03 
92 Catholic Action of HawaiiJPeace Educ. Project v. Brown, 643 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1980). 
93 [d. 
94 [d. 
95 See id. 
96 [d. at 571. 
97 Catholic Action, 643 F.2d at 572. 
98 [d. 
99 [d. 
100 See id. 
101 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of HawaiilPeace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 141 (1981). 
102 [d. 
103 [d. 
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The Court began its analysis with a review of the purpose of NEP A's 
public disclosure provision.104 The Court found that the determinative 
language of NEPA was section 102(2)(C), which states that federal 
agencies are to publish the results of an EIS "to the fullest extent 
possible."105 This section also provides for national security interests 
by subjecting the publication of an EIS to the guidelines imposed by 
FOIA,ul6 The Court concluded that section 102(2)(C) serves a dual 
purpose: to require federal agencies to consider the possible environ-
mental consequences of their proposed actions, and to notify the public 
that the agencies were making such considerations.107 The Court held, 
however, that "[p]ublic disclosure of the EIS is expressly governed 
by FOIA."108 
By emphasizing that FOIA controlled this public notification pur-
pose of section 102(2)(C), the Court was able to drive a wedge between 
NEPA's two purposes.1oo Although the Court recognized NEPA's dual 
purpose, the Court reasoned that the two purposes were not insepa-
rable,uo The Court determined that section 102(2)(C) indicated that 
Congress had envisioned the possibility that an agency might be 
required to prepare an EIS without having to disclose it to the pub-
lic.111 Using this analysis, the Court held that a given government 
action might require the preparation of an EIS that would not be 
made public due to FOIA-based restrictions,u2 FOIA's exemptions 
from section 102(2)( C) of NEPA, the Court concluded, were the result 
of Congress's recognition that there would be government actions so 
completely intertwined with national security interests that the agency 
involved simply could not notify the public of either the action or its 
possible environmental consequences.113 
The Court's conclusion meant that the circuit court's idea of a 
hypothetical EIS was not a valid solution to the problem of how to 
address NEP A's goal of public notification without divulging classified 
information. The Court determined that the concept of a hypothetical 
EIS was a departure from the legislative intent behind section 102(2)(C), 
104 [d. at 142-43. 
105 [d. at 142. 
106 Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 142-43. 
107 [d. at 143. 
108 [d. 
109 See id. 
110 [d. 
111 Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 143. 
112 [d. 
113 See id. at 145. 
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which the Court felt clearly subordinated NEPA to FOIA.l14 The 
Court concluded that an agency's decision to publish an EIS relied on 
two separate balancing tests:1l5 a determination of whether national 
security interests outweighed the public's general claim to govern-
ment information, and a determination of whether the purposes of 
FOIA outweighed the purposes of NEPA.ll6 Under the first test, the 
government had determined that almost all information regarding 
nuclear weapons storage was classified.ll7 Under the second test, the 
Navy had determined that preparing an EIS required acting against 
the national interest, as evidenced by the government's decision to 
classify that information.1l8 
The Court also noted that the only type ofEIS that the Navy could 
have prepared regarding the storage facility was a classified EIS.ll9 
The Court argued that, by preparing a classified E IS, the Navy would 
be fulfilling its NEPA obligations of considering the environmental 
impact of its actions.120 A classified EIS would be a purely internal 
document, issued by and for those personnel engaged in planning the 
storage facility.121 
The Court then turned its attention to the proposed weapons stor-
age site, holding that the Navy was not required to prepare an EIS 
for the site.122 The Court based its holding on what it perceived to be 
a clear distinction between contemplated and proposed actions.123 Be-
cause the Navy had said that the site was capable of nuclear weapons 
storage without saying whether such storage would take place, the 
Navy essentially had left that capability as a "contemplated," rather 
than a "proposed," action.124 Because the storage of nuclear weapons 
was a contemplated action, there was no basis for concluding that the 
114Id. at 144. 
115 See id. at 144-45. In addition to the balancing tests noted by the Court is the initial 
balancing test of whether a proposed agency action possesses those characteristics that neces-
sitate the preparation of an EIS. Id. at 14l. 
116 Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 144. 
117 Id. 
118Id. at 144-45. Much of this analysis was dicta, however, because the Navy had decided that 
an EIS was not necessary due to a lack of any foreseeable significant environmental conse-
quences. Id. at 14l. 
119 See id. 
120 Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 146. 
121Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 146. 
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Navy had to prepare an EIS for that action.125 Implicit in this reason-
ing was the Court's belief that a contemplated action was merely a 
potential action, while a proposed action was one that the proposing 
agency was actively pursuing.126 
The Court concluded by declaring that the question of the Navy's 
compliance with NEPA was "beyond judicial scrutiny."127 The Navy's 
regulations regarding non-disclosure of nuclear weapons information 
had exempted the Navy from NEPA guidelines for any proposed 
action involving such weapons because the mere fact of the Navy's 
involvement automatically transformed the proposed action into a 
contemplated action.128 The potential thus existed for any government 
agency to avoid NEPA scrutiny simply by linking its proposed actions 
to classified information.129 This possibility threatened what even the 
Court recognized as one of NEP A's primary goals: the publication of 
information designed to inform and assure the public that the federal 
government was actively considering the environmental impact of its 
actions.13o 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, addressed this threat 
in his concurring opinion.131 Although Justice Blackmun agreed with 
the outcome of the case-that classified information was ipso facto so 
important to national security that it should not be released to the 
public as part of an EIS-he differed with the Court's opinion regard-
ing how to address the problem of classified information in an EIS.132 
Justice Blackmun noted that the Department of Defense's own 
regulations stated that the fact that a proposed action involved clas-
sified information did not relieve the Department of the duty of com-
plying with NEPA by preparing an EIS.133 Those regulations state, 
as NEPA itself does,134 that the resulting EIS should be available to 
as many people as possible.135 Like the majority, Justice Blackmun 
125 Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 146. 
126 See id. This reasoning begs the question of why the Navy would bother to describe the 
facility as "nuclear capable" if it were not planning to use that capability. 
127Id. 
128 See id. 
129 See Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 146. 
130 See id. at 143. 
131Id. at 147 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
132 See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
13B Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
134 This refers to NEPA's purpose of disseminating the information of an EIS "to the fullest 
extent possible." Id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
135 See Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 147-48 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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referred back to the purpose of NEPA's EIS requirement-to force 
federal agencies to include analysis of a given action's likely environ-
mental consequences in an agency's overall analysis of that action's 
feasibility.136 He remarked, however, that this purpose "is no less true 
when the public is unaware of the agency's proposals."137 
Justice Blackmun argued that the majority had gone too far in its 
treatment of classified information.138 He believed that, where feasi-
ble, an agency should prepare an EIS in such a way as to keep the 
classified information in specific sections which could then be withheld 
from the public, thereby allowing the public to view at least some of 
the EIS.139 Although he admitted that such a solution was imperfect, 
Justice Blackmun opined that this action would place some ofthe EIS 
in public hands, and, at least partially, fulfill NEP A's goal of public 
disclosure.14o 
Justice Blackmun expressed concern that the majority opinion posed 
a real threat to the purpose of NEPA, and thus he argued for public 
disclosure of as much of an EIS as possible. l4l As Justice Blackmun 
noted, preparation of an EIS becomes especially important when the 
public will be unable to see the EIS due to the involvement of clas-
sified information.142 Because the public will not be able to see or 
respond to such an EIS, the agency involved bears the especially 
important burden of ensuring that the public's environmental inter-
ests are recognized as part of the agency's overall feasibility study of 
its proposed action.143 Justice Blackmun wrote that any federal agency 
that was exempted from disclosing an EIS for national security rea-
sons had to do everything possible to ensure that it complied with the 
letter and spirit of NEPA.144 In contrast, the majority opinion could 
136Id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
137Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
138Id. at 149 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun based this argument on a hypo-
thetical agency action involving classified information. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). He agreed 
with the majority, however, that the facts of Catholic Action did not require the Navy to prepare 
an EIS at all. Id. at 150 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
139 Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 149 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Council on Environ-
mental Quality Agency Compliance 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(c) (1994) (stating that "the unclassified 
portions [of an EIS] can be made available to the public"). 
140 See Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 149 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
141 See id. at 148-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
142Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
143 See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
144 See Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 148-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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allow such agencies to avoid NEPA compliance by invoking their 
national security privileges.145 
This result in fact occurred in Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. 
v. Department of the Navy, in which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit denied plaintiffs the option of in cam-
era review.146 Hudson River dealt with the Navy's plan to construct a 
home port on Staten Island, New York, for a battleship and several 
attendant ships.147 As in Catholic Action, the Navy admitted that 
several of the ships were capable of holding nuclear weapons, but 
neither confirmed nor denied whether any of those ships would actually 
carry nuclear weapons.148 What made this case different from a sim-
ple application of Catholic Action's holding was the fact that the 
plaintiffs-a coalition of environmental groups, members of the New 
York City Council-and nearby residents, had received information 
alleging that the Navy did in fact plan to have nuclear weapons at the 
site.149 
The plaintiffs used this information in their request that the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York review in 
camera the Navy's EIS and the Government Accounting Office's re-
port to determine whether the EIS was adequate.15o That court held 
that an in camera review would still result in a public disclosure of 
classified information, and thus declined to perform such review.151 
The court reasoned that, while the actual review of the material might 
preserve its secrecy, the review's outcome might result in a disclosure 
of classified information.152 If the court held for the plaintiffs, the 
result would imply that nuclear weapons would be positioned at the 
site, thereby releasing precisely that information which the Navy 
145 See id. at 147-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
148 Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 423 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
147 ld. at 416. 
148ld. 
149 ld. at 422-23. The information in question was a classified report issued by the United 
States General Accounting Office (GAO) that had been prepared for New York Congressman 
Ted Weiss. ld. Congressman Weiss, an opponent of the site, then told the plaintiffs about the 
report's contents. ld. at 423. 
150 Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of the Navy, No. CV--86--3292, 1989 
WL 50794, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 1989). 
151 See id. at *5. 
152ld. 
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sought to protect.l53 The court thus saw no alternative but to dismiss 
the plaintiffs' claims regarding nuclear weapons storage.l54 
This analysis was, however, largely ignored by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which instead based its 
decision to affirm the district court upon what it saw as the plaintiffs' 
inability to establish a prima facie case.l55 This shift in emphasis may 
have been based on the Second Circuit's desire to bring the decision 
more into line with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in 
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project.156 
This is suggested by the Second Circuit's use of the Supreme Court's 
analysis in basing its decision only on what the plaintiffs could allege, 
rather than on what the judiciary actually could do.157 By interpreting 
the Supreme Court in this fashion, the Second Circuit abandoned its 
responsibility to ensure that the Navy was complying with federallaw.l58 
Had the Second Circuit exercised the option of ordering a complete 
in camera review of the facts of the case, it might have given the trial 
court a better understanding of the facts. This opportunity is the 
essential benefit of in camera review for cases involving classified 
information-the reviewing court gains access to information denied 
the plaintiffs and is thus able to stand in for the plaintiffs in making 
a ruling that supports the general public interest even as it upholds 
the law. By refusing to order in camera review, the Second Circuit 
abdicated its duty to ensure that the Navy had complied with NEPA. 
IV. USING IN CAMERA REVIEW TO RESOLVE THE 
NEPA-FOIA CONFLICT 
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Catholic Action ad-
dress the question of preparing an EIS as having mutually exclusive 
153 [d. The court did note that a judgment for the defendants would result in no disclosure of 
classified information, but this was more than offset by the risk of disclosure following a ruling 
for the plaintiffs. [d. 
154 [d. 
165 See Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of the Navy, 891 F.2d 421, 421 (2d 
Cir. 1989). 
156 See id. at 420-21; see also Weinberger v. Catholic Action of HawaiilPeace Educ. Project, 
454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
157 See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 421. See also infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
158 See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 424. The Second Circuit concluded its decision by affirming 
that the Navy generally had to comply with NEPA, but the court simultaneously noted that 
the circumstances of the case prevented the court from scrutinizing the Navy's compliance. [d. 
This was mere lip service to the goals of NEPA. See id. 
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answers: either an agency must make an EIS public or the presence 
of classified information renders the EIS a classified document.159 By 
doing so, the United States Supreme Court neglected several alter-
native ways of approaching the problem of an EIS that contains 
classified information. The Court's failure to address these alterna-
tives may result in an assumption by lower courts that the Court's 
omission was actually a rej ection. 
The United States Supreme Court actually did reject the first of 
these alternatives by dismissing the hypothetical EIS as a "creature 
of judicial cloth."160 The Court ignored the fact that an EIS is, by 
definition, a hypothetical document.161 The purpose of NEPA's EIS 
regulation is to force agencies to study the possible environmental 
results of actions that those agencies are considering, and the result-
ing EIS is thus an analysis of hypothetical environmental results. l62 
The Court's distinction between proposed and contemplated actions 
is a false distinction because at the time ofEIS preparation an agency 
has not yet decided whether to undertake the action considered in the 
EIS.163 The Navy's actual decision to store nuclear weapons at the site 
would remain a secret, while the EIS would notify the public merely 
that the Navy was considering such an action.l64 
The Court also failed to address the possibility of in camera review 
for those EISs that involve classified information. In camera review 
of an EIS with classified information would be comprised of two tests. 
Under the first test, the court would determine whether an agency 
has a valid claim to withhold information under FOIA.165 If the court 
found that the claim was valid, it would then apply the second test 
and review the EIS to ensure that the agency actually had complied 
with NEP A.166 Courts have granted such a review in those instances in 
which both parties already are familiar with the classified information.167 
159 Justice Blackmun's concurrence attempted to mediate between these positions by suggest-
ing partial pUblication of an EIS involving classified information. See supra note 139 and 
accompanying text. This suggestion simply applied the majority's analysis to individual sections 
within an EIS, it did not propose a different method of addressing the conflict between NEPA 
and national security. See Catholic Action 454 U.S. at 149 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
160 [d. at 141. 
161 Stephen Dycus, NEPA Secrets, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 307 (1993). 
162 See id. 
163 [d. 
164 See id. 
165 [d. at 308. 
166 Dycus, supra note 161, at 308. 
167 [d. at 308 n.49; see, e.g., Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130, 1131-32 
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In most NEPA cases, however, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs will 
have access to the classified information at issue. Currently, the best 
available solution for such situations is to hold independent in camera 
review of an agency's compliance with NEPA.l68 This is an imperfect 
solution, lacking the benefits of a normal adversarial trial, but it at 
least imposes some form of outside review of an agency's compliance 
with NEPA.169 
V. CONCLUSION 
The record of decisions involving NEPA-FOIA conflicts generally 
has shown national security matters to be more important than envi-
ronmental concerns.170 This trend accurately reflects Congress's deci-
sion to subject NEPA to the strictures of FOIA. However, in follow-
ing Congress's intent, the courts have paid too much attention to the 
federal agencies' desire to maintain secrecy at an unknown cost to the 
environmental well-being of the nation. 
This judicially sanctioned silence is especially dangerous because 
the military's environmental record has been disastrous. Many former 
military sites are now unusable due to the improper use or disposal 
of radioactive or toxic materials.171 Alleged activities at sites such as 
Groom Lake have endangered people as well as the local environment. 
Arguably, one could defend the military's environmental damage as 
being the cost of maintaining the United States against aggression. 
Yet even under this argument, the absence of as formidable a threat 
as the Soviet Union should require the military to do a better envi-
ronmental accounting of its actions. The continuing threat of other 
nations, while still significant, does not require that we pursue mili-
(2d Cir. 1977) (in camera review appropriate where parties to Air Force contract already had 
access to classified information); Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1958) (in 
camera review appropriate in patent application case where parties and witnesses were aware 
of the invention). 
168 See Dycus, supra note 161, at 308. Professor Dycus has suggested several possible methods 
of addressing the conflict between NEPA and national security concerns. [d. at 310. These 
include the creation of special courts authorized to hear such cases. [d. This solution would have 
the advantage of using a court that would, by necessity, develop a strong expertise in balaricing 
environmental concerns with national security. [d. Congress also could authorize a "special 
independent environmental attorney," who would be given the necessary clearances to prose-
cute such cases on behalf of the government or individual plaintiffs. [d. 
169 [d. at 309. 
170 See supra section III.B. 
171 See Sauber, supra note 78, at 808-11. 
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tary supremacy at all costs, including the degradation of our environ-
mentY2 
The judiciary's response to the conflict between NEPA and FOIA 
has neglected NEP A's goal of environmental accounting. Although 
Congress intended that an agency not release an EIS if that EIS 
contains classified materials, Congress did intend all agencies to un-
dertake an EIS whenever the agencies' actions so require. By failing 
to utilize in camera review, courts have abdicated their responsibility 
of interpreting and balancing conflicting statutes. There is no real 
conflict between NEP A's accounting and disclosure goals, because 
courts have the power to step in and oversee an agency's environ-
mental accounting when national security interests will prevent the 
public from doing SO.173 
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project 
and Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of the Navy 
reveal courts' failure to consider the origins and purpose of NEPA.174 
Congress enacted NEPA in response to complaints that the federal 
government was not adequately accounting for the environmental 
consequences of its actions. NEPA was intended to force this account-
ing and to provide the public with the power to oversee and comment 
on this accounting. While there may be occasions when the public 
should be prevented from seeing an EIS, courts always should be 
prepared to stand in for the public to ensure that the government is 
complying with NEPA. By failing to do so, courts have permitted 
federal agencies that use classified information to exploit those mate-
rials in order to justify expanded secrecy. These agencies, which the 
public cannot observe, are those that most require judicial oversight 
regarding their compliance with NEPA. If courts fail to assess their 
compliance, no one else can or will. 
172 HourcIe, supra note 1, at 318-19. 
173 See supra section IV. 
174 See supra section II.A. 
